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Abstract 
To facilitate the energy transition, regulators can choose between several policy options 
to stimulate energy-efficient design by firms. One possibility is to target firms directly 
through standards or subsidies. Alternatively, it is possible to influence firms indirectly 
by targeting firms’ stakeholders and raising consumer awareness through information 
campaigns and education. In this paper, we focus specifically on the pivotal role of 
consumers and we investigate the effectiveness of subsidies, product standards, and 
education in improving firms’ environmental performance through energy-efficient 
product design. In particular, we investigate the importance of the interaction effect 
between the regulation and consumers’ environmental awareness under different mar-
ket structures. We find that a policy based on a product standard can counteract the 
negative effects of crowding-out consumers’ intrinsic motivation in a monopoly set-
ting, although this counteracting effect is less powerful under a duopoly. However, a 
subsidy does not provide such a backup system and the full effect of crowding-out 
will be visible. 
Keywords Environmental policy instruments · Energy-efficient design ·
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Citizens and governments are increasingly worried about satisfying societal needs 
without exceeding our planetary boundaries (Raworth 2017). Resource scarcity, cli-
mate change, and environmental concerns have stimulated companies and regulators to 
promote amove toward a decarbonized and sustainable economy.The energy transition 
plays a crucial role in this evolution as ‘access to clean, affordable and reliable energy 
has been a cornerstone of the world’s increasing prosperity and economic growth’ 
(Chu and Majumdar 2012, p. 294) or as Peter Voser as CEO of Royal Dutch Shell 
said ‘energy is the oxygen of the economy’ (World Economic Forum 2012, p. 2). Core 
elements of the energy transition are decarbonization and decreasing energy demand. 
A wide variety of actions and policies are used, and needed, to facilitate this transition. 
In this paper, we focus on firms’ decisions regarding energy-efficient product design. 
Energy-efficient product design is closely related to the concepts of green design 
or eco-design, which aim at reducing the environmental impact of products, including 
the energy consumption throughout their entire life cycle while preserving a product’s 
quality level (Fullerton and Wu 1998). Therefore, energy-efficient product design 
includes a focus on embodied energy in the good as well as energy consumption during 
the use phase (Rahimifard et al. 2010).Asmentioned byMorini et al. (2019), embodied 
energy and carbon footprints are interesting indicators for selecting materials with 
a lower environmental burden during the product life cycle. The focus on energy 
efficiency during the use phase, on the other hand, has led to widespread concerns 
regarding rebound effects (Gillingham et al. 2016), and mitigation of these rebound 
effects is increasingly seen as a crucial aspect of energy policies (Vivanco et al. 2016). 
The European Commission has acknowledged early on that there is a worldwide 
demand for more efficient products to reduce energy and resource consumption, which 
resulted in the implementation of the Eco-Design Directive1 in 2009. This directive 
provides consistent EU-wide rules for improving the environmental performance of 
products, such as household appliances, and information and communication tech-
nologies. The EU legislation on eco-design and energy labeling is an effective tool for 
improving the environmental performance of products by setting mandatory minimum 
standards for their energy efficiency. This eliminates the least performing products 
from the market, significantly contributing to the EU’s energy efficiency objective. As 
reported by the European Commission (2019), by 2020 this framework is estimated 
to deliver energy savings of around 154 Mtoe per year in primary energy, which trans-
lates into e470 savings per EU household per year on energy bills. The framework 
also contributes to energy security by reducing the import of energy into the EU by the 
equivalent of 1.1 billion barrels of oil each year, and it contributes to the mitigation of 
climate change by reducing CO2 emissions by 320 million tons annually. 
Concerned stakeholders such as businesses, local authorities, and environmental 
NGOs support the European regulator’s desire to impose minimum standards for 
energy efficiency for different product categories (e.g., Friends of the Earth 2010; EEB 
2019). However, past studies have revealed that mandatory regulation and use of eco-
1 Directive 2009/125/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 establishing 
a framework for the setting of eco-design requirements for energy-related products. 
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nomic incentives can crowd out voluntary action (e.g., Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997; 
Kreps 1997; Nyborg and Rege 2003; Underhill 2016). For example, the implementa-
tion of amonetary reward system can actually reduce volunteering, even though—once 
implemented—the size of rewards increases volunteering (Frey andGötte 1999). Thus, 
stakeholders’ awareness can influence, or be influenced by, regulation. 
Political scientists are well aware that shifts in public opinion can lead to policy 
shifts (Hakhverdian 2012). For example, Anderson et al. (2017) show that as public 
opinion shifts toward prioritizing the environment, a significant and positive effect 
on the rate of renewable energy policy outputs by governments in Europe can be 
found. However, the opinion–policy link can work in both ways as politicians can 
also influence public opinion (Hakhverdian 2012). Democratic leadership occurs 
when the public’s policy preferences align with the government’s preferences (Geer 
1996), while the counter-movement claims that public opinion may run counter to 
government policy in certain instances (Wlezien and Soroka 2012). Thus, while 
opinion and policy may move together in some policy domains, this is not necessarily 
the case for all domains. Positive as well as negative feedbacks between public 
opinion and policy may exist. For example, Stadelmann-Steffen and Eder (2020) 
investigate the link between existing domestic energy policies and individual policy 
instrument preferences in 21 European countries. While they do not find evidence 
of a general link between existing policies and future policy preferences, they do 
find that individuals with strong climate change attitudes and high levels of political 
trust experience positive feedback effects. As another example of a positive feedback, 
several studies on renewable energy infrastructure found that the public’s opposition 
toward wind parks or high voltage lines decreased with real-life experience and 
exposure (e.g., Firestone et al. 2012; Olson-Hazboun et al. 2016). On the other hand, 
Stokes (2013) found a negative feedback in the case of Ontario’s feed-in tariff policies 
which was mainly driven by expected future energy costs. 
In this paper, we investigate how firms’ incentives for energy-efficient design 
are affected by these interactions between consumers’ awareness and public policy. 
Explicitly accounting for such interactions is crucial because they are sensitive to the 
policy instruments used. Regulators can choose between several policy options in order 
to stimulate energy-efficient design by firms. Instruments can target firms directly 
through standards or subsidies; or they can influence firms indirectly by targeting 
firms’ stakeholders and raising consumer awareness through information campaigns 
and education. While the first option seems to target firms directly, it can also generate 
an indirect effect through its impact on consumer awareness. On the one hand, con-
sumers can perceive the regulatory action as a signal of the seriousness of the societal 
problem, and consequently, they can decide to reward firms’ efforts toward increasing 
energy efficiency more than before. On the other hand, social norms can be crowded 
out by the regulatory action, which may lead to lower social pressure by consumers. 
Specifically, we analyze the pivotal role of consumers on the effectiveness of 
subsidies, product standards, and education in improving firms’ environmental 
performance through energy-efficient product design. In particular, we investigate 
the importance of the interaction effect between the regulation and consumers’ envi-
ronmental awareness. To this end, we first consider a base model where a monopolist 
chooses prices and product energy efficiency under four different scenarios: (1) a 
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baseline laissez-faire scenario, (2) an education-based policy, (3) a product standard, 
and (4) a technology subsidy. While crowding-in effects reinforce the policy effec-
tiveness and may even incentivize over-compliance, the net effect of crowding-out is 
ambiguous. Next, we investigate the impact of competition on these results by looking 
at a model of product differentiation where two firms take simultaneous decisions on 
prices and product energy efficiency. We find that competition decreases the average 
level of product energy efficiency in the market as well as the prices. The net effects 
of crowding-out very much depend on the type of policy instrument used, but in 
general, we can conclude that the counteracting effects of the regulatory standard 
on crowding-out are less powerful than under monopoly. Finally, for completeness, 
we change the timing of the duopoly game and allow firms to first select the energy 
efficiency level of the product and then decide on the prices. This leads to a higher 
degree of product differentiation and may even stimulate one of the firms to be more 
energy-efficient than in a monopoly situation. Counteracting effects of the regulatory 
policy are also present under this alternative formulation. 
Our paper is close to the literature on environmental policy in product differentiation 
models, but the main difference in our setting is that we model consumer awareness to 
depend on the stringency of the regulatory policy, while the related studies consider 
the two variables as being independent from each other. One of the most related studies 
is Moraga-Gonzalez and Padron-Fumero (2002), who analyze a duopoly setting in a 
vertical product differentiation model. Firms simultaneously decide on the production 
technology (being cleaner or dirtier) in the first stage, and they compete in prices in the 
second stage. In equilibrium, a cleaner and a dirtier variant coexist, and a maximum 
unit emission standard reduces unit emissions of both variants and thus boosts firms’ 
sales with negative impacts on aggregate emissions. Besides the addition of crowding-
in and crowding-out effects on this analysis, we study an alternative timing where 
the two firms take simultaneous decisions on prices and product energy efficiency. 
In this setting, we find the opposite effect to the one found in Moraga-González 
and Padrón-Fumero (2002). While the imposition of the standard causes an effect 
in the same direction on both firms in the model of sequential moves, in the model 
of simultaneous moves we find opposing effects that diminish differentiation and 
end up in zero prices. Hence, the timing of decisions becomes crucial regarding the 
effectiveness of environmental policy stringency. 
Other related works are Espinola-Arredondo and Zhao (2012), who investigate how 
a tax/subsidy policy can promote the consumption of green products in the context 
of horizontal product differentiation; Casino and Granero (2018), who model the 
market entry decision as well as the product differentiation decision in a spokes model 
with a large number of potential varieties; or Rodriguez Ibeas (2007), who consider a 
vertical differentiationmodel to analyze the effect of (exogenous) changes in consumer 
awareness on social welfare. However, none of these studies analyze the changes in 
consumer awareness as a result of changes in the stringency of the environmental 
policy. 
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. We describe the base monopoly 
model in the following section. In Sect. 3, we present the results under different scenar-
ios. In Sect. 4, we consider two versions of a duopoly model (one with simultaneous 
decisions and the other with sequential choices), and we compare the results with 
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those obtained in Sect. 3. We conclude in Sect. 5. All the proofs are in a mathematical 
‘Appendix.’ 
2 Base model 
We assume that a monopolist produces a consumption good characterized by some 
environmental features. (We will add competition at a later stage.) The firm can decide 
on the unit price p, as well as on the environmental attribute, or energy efficiency, of 
the product, g. For example, g can reflect the energy needed during the use phase (e.g., 
fuel efficiency of a car) or the level of embedded carbon. We assume that the energy 
efficiency level of the product does not affect the unit production cost (assumed to be 
zero, for simplicity), but it will affect the firm’s remaining operation costs, denoted as 
2c(g)  α2 g , with α > 0.2 
The demand for the product is characterized by a mass of consumers that differ 
with respect to their initial willingness to pay for the environmental features. The 
willingness to purchase energy-efficient products is denoted as γ , and we assume that   
it is uniformly distributed in the interval γ̄ − L, γ̄ , with L ∈ (0, γ )¯ . We assume 
that each consumer can buy at most one unit of the product. Consumers’ (indirect) 
utility from consuming the product depends positively on the energy efficiency g and 
negatively on the unit price p, as follows: 
U  γ g − p, (1) 
while consumers’ reservation utility from not purchasing the product is assumed to be 
zero. 
In order to stimulate energy-efficient design, the regulator has several options, and 
here we focus on three policy alternatives. Firstly, the regulator can directly increase 
consumers’ awareness about the environmental impact of consumption choices and 
the importance to adopt a sustainable lifestyle (that is, increase γ̄ ) through educational 
campaigns.3 Secondly, the regulator can opt for a centralized approach by imposing a 
product standard ḡ, which may force the firm to supply products that are more energy 
efficient.4 Thirdly, the regulator can provide a technology subsidy s for the firm to 
stimulate the production of products that are more energy efficient. 
2 Moraga-Gonzalez and Padron-Fumero (2002) also assume that the environmental attribute does not affect 
the unit production costs. This is obviously a simplification of reality, but it helps us to make the model 
tractable, particularly in the duopoly cases that we analyze later on. 
3 The idea that information provision may have positive externalities is an important argument in favor of 
public support for education: Educating people may lead them to participate in activities that have external 
benefits (Kennedy et al. 1994). In this paper, we adhere to this idea. However, in contexts of asymmetric 
information about the severity of an environmental problem (not considered in this paper), Asheim (2010) 
shows that moral motivation provides a rationale for skepticism toward government information provision 
(such as climate change skepticism). Thus, unless the government can make a credible commitment to 
always share all available information, the problem cannot be solved simply by promising to be unbiased 
in the information provision, as citizens cannot verify whether the promise is being kept (Nyborg 2018). 
4 For example, the firmmaybe required to use aminimumamount of decarbonizedmaterial, or to implement 
maximum limits to (passive) standby and off-mode power use for electrical appliances (e.g., to comply with 
the EU Eco-Design Directive 2009/125/EC). 
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The first policy option directly increases consumer awareness γ̄ . However, the 
product standard and the technology subsidy can have an indirect impact on consumer 
awareness, which can be positive or negative. For example, consumers can interpret 
the presence of an environmental policy as a signal of the seriousness of the societal 
problem, which may make them more aware of the impact of their consumption deci-
sions and increase γ̄ . We label this process as ‘crowding-in.’ Or, as another example, 
the presence of a regulation may decrease intrinsic incentives to buy energy-efficient 
products and may thus decrease γ̄ . This is labeled as the ‘crowding-out’ effect. In 
the following section, we describe in detail the consequences of these effects on the 
performance of the different environmental policy options. 
3 Results 
For presentation purposes, we first analyze the firm’s problem in the absence of any 
intervention. Then, we study the performance of the three different policy scenarios 
described above, and we discuss the mentioned crowding effects. 
3.1 Firm behavior under laissez-faire 
Given the indirect utility function presented in (1) and zero reservation utility, a con-
sumer with marginal willingness to pay for energy efficiency γ purchases the product 
as long as γ g ≥ p. Thus, only consumers with γ ≥ p are willing to purchase the g 
pproduct. Conversely, consumers with γ < g do not purchase the product. Since γ is   
uniformly distributed in the interval γ̄ − L, γ̄ , the aggregate demand for a product 
with energy efficiency level g and unit price p is: 
Q  γ̄ − gp · (2) 
The objective of the monopolist is to find the product price p and energy efficiency 
level g to maximize profits π as follows: 
  
max π  pQ − c(g)  p γ̄ − p − α 2 g 2 g (3)p,g 
The following first-order conditions characterize the solution of this problem: 
∂π 2p γ̄ −  0 
∂p g 
 2
∂π p − αg  0 
∂g g 




Proposition 1 In the absence of any policy intervention, the monopolist’s optimal 
γ 3M  ¯choices of the product price and energy effciency level are, respectively, p 8α
γ 2M  ¯and g 4α . 
Clearly, both choice variables are increasing in consumers’ awareness γ̄ and 
decreasing in the parameter that reflects the cost of producing more energy-efficient 
products, α. Substituting the optimal solution into the aggregate demand, firm’s profits,  
and consumers’ surplus C SM , we, respectively, obtain: 
pM γ̄ γ̄
QM  γ̄ −  Q  γ̄ − 
gM 2 2 
 2 γ 4 MπM  pM QM − α g  ¯
2 32α  
γ̄   γ̄ γ 2 γ 3 γ 4¯ ¯ ¯MCSM  ∫ γ gM − p dγ  ∫ γ − dγ  .
γ /¯ 2 γ /¯ 2 4α 8α 32α
Note that the aggregate demand, firm’s profits, and consumers’ surplus are affected 
by consumers’ awareness and production costs in the same way: The three functions 
increase with consumer awareness, γ̄ , and decrease with the cost of energy efficiency, 
α. 
3.2 Policy scenarios 
We now study the monopolist’s optimal choices under three policy scenarios: (i) rais-
ing consumers’ awareness through educational campaigns; (ii) imposing a product 
standard; and (iii) giving a subsidy for investing in an energy-efficient production 
technology. The second and third possibilities may give rise to crowding effects, and 
we discuss the various possibilities. 
3.2.1 Raising awareness 
The results in Proposition 1 suggest that raising γ̄ (through educational campaigns 
or advertising) has a direct effect on both the price and the energy efficiency level of 
the product. A more conscious population will induce the monopolist to increase the 
energy efficiency level of the product and charge a larger price. Raising γ̄ also results 
in increases in aggregate demand (QM ), firm’s profits (πM ), and consumers’ surplus 
(CSM ). 
3.2.2 Product standard 
Now, we assume that the government decides to implement a standard on the energy 
efficiency level of the firm, ḡ. The problem the monopolist solves is the following5: 
5 Throughout the paper, we assume perfect compliance. Hence, our results reflect the upper-bound impact 




γ − p − α 2max π  pQ − c(g)  p ¯ ,g 2 g p,g (4) 
s.t. g ≥ ḡ,
and the result is provided next. 
Proposition 2 Under a product standard ḡ, the monopolist’s solution is the following: 
γ 2 γ 3 γ 2¯(i) If ≥ ḡ, then pM  ¯ and gM  ¯ .4α 8α 4α
γ̄ 2 M  γ̄< ¯ ¯(ii) If g, then p g and gM  ḡ.4α 2 
Given that consumers value energy efficiency, the monopolist over-complies with 
the product standard as long as the level set by the regulator is small enough (case i). 
Alternatively, the monopolist just complies with the standard (case ii). This result is 
illustrated in Fig. 1, where we present the monopolist’s optimal choices for the price 
and the energy efficiency level for the different values of the product standard, ḡ. The  
result in Proposition 1 (laissez-faire) corresponds to the particular case where ḡ  0 
in Fig. 1. Since there exists a demand for energy efficiency, the monopolist finds it 
optimal to present more stringent attributes than those required by the law, as long as 
the requirements are lax enough. Obviously, when the law becomes more demanding 
than the business-as-usual level, the firm decides to just comply with the standard, and 
the induced price increases with ḡ. 
In the context of a product standard, crowding-in and crowding-out effects may 
arise. Crowding-in refers to a rise in consumers’ awareness once the product standard 




Fig. 2 Product standards with 
crowding-out 
is in place. The way to model this effect is by assuming that γ̄ is an increasing function 
of ¯
will become even more energy efficient. However, there can be situations where the 
g 
presence of a product standard induces crowding-out. For example, consumers may 
complain about the price increase induced by the regulatory measure as they may be 
concerned by their daily cost of living (e.g., Sterner 2012; Ribot 2013). In this case, 
the final effect may be lower than expected. This is illustrated in Fig. 2, where we 
. If this is the case, the effect of the product standard is reinforced and production 
gassume that γ̄ is a decreasing function of ¯. As a result of the decrease in function 
gγ̄ 2/4α as long as ¯ increases, the monopolist decreases the optimal energy efficiency 
level in the region of over-compliance (with the corresponding decrease in the product 
price), and the region itself shrinks, as compared to the region of just compliance, 
which remains unchanged. 
3.2.3 Technology subsidy 
The results in Proposition 1 suggest that a technology subsidy (represented by a 
decrease in parameter α) causes an increase in both the energy efficiency level and 
the product price. These effects are illustrated in Fig. 3. Now, while the presence of 
crowding-in surely reinforces the effect of the technology subsidy causing further 
increases in both choice variables, the presence of crowding-out might create some 
ambiguities. If we assume that γ̄ is an increasing function of α, meaning that the lower 
the value of α (or the larger the amount of the subsidy) the lower the consumer aware-
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Fig. 3 Technology subsidy 
without crowding effects 
ness γ̄ , then a marginal decrease in α causes the following effect on energy efficiency 
(there is a qualitatively similar effect on the price): 
dg ∂g ∂g + · γ̄ (α).
dα ∂α ∂γ̄
The first term of the derivative is negative (see Proposition 1), which means that a 
marginal decrease in parameter α causes an increase in energy efficiency, g. Note, 
however, that the second term of the derivative is positive under crowding-out. (The 
effect of γ̄ on g is positive, and the effect of α on γ̄ is positive as well.) Hence, as 
long as α decreases, it is not clear at all whether the net effect on the energy efficiency 
level is positive or negative, and the answer critically depends on the assumption we 
make on the specific relation between γ̄ and α, which is an empirical issue. Indeed, 
it is not difficult to construct examples where the final outcome can go in either 
direction. Figure 4 illustrates a situation where the presence of crowding-out can be 
very detrimental: In this case, imposing a subsidy is not recommended at all.6 
6 The case of the figure can be obtained if we assume a function γ̄  ξα to account for crowding-out. 
Substituting this expression into the optimal energy-efficient level presented in Proposition 1, we obtain 
2αM  ξg 4 . In this case, the imposition of a subsidy (represented by a decrease in α) causes a decrease 
in energy efficiency as well as in the price of the product. As another example, we can instead assume 





/2 . Here, the subsidy (i.e., a decrease in α) causes an increase in 
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Fig. 4 Technology subsidy with 
crowding-out 
From the analyses above, and by comparing Figs. 2 and 4, we can conclude that 
although a product standard can avoid the detrimental effects of crowding-out, this 
may not be the case if a technology subsidy is in place. In fact, the case of Fig. 4 
is telling us that there might be circumstances where giving a technology subsidy 
ends up having the opposite effect to the expected one. A product standard has a 
mandatory dimension that forces the firm to improve its energy efficiency, while a 
technology subsidy has a voluntary dimension as the firm does not have to use the 
subsidy to improve its energy efficiency. Our analysis then suggests caution in the use 
of subsidies when crowding-out is present. 
4 Adding competition 
In this section, we extend our model to allow for competition between two (ex ante) 
identical firms.We consider two alternative timings. First, we assume that the twofirms 
decide prices and energy efficiency levels simultaneously. In an alternative scenario, 
we assume that the two firms choose energy efficiency levels in the first place, and they 
later choose prices contingent on the previously chosen energy efficiency levels. This 
second scenario is the one assumed in Moraga-Gonzalez and Padron-Fumero (2002) 
Footnote 6 continued 
both energy efficiency and the price, although the effects are softer than in the absence of crowding-out. 
In this case, the counteracting effect of crowding-out does not fully compensate the positive effect of the 
technology subsidy and the net effects on prices and energy efficiency are still positive. 
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and may represent a situation where the costs associated with the energy efficiency 
level g are mainly installation (or setup) costs. In this case, the choice of energy 
efficiency levels is considered as a long-term decision. 
4.1 Simultaneous choices under laissez-faire 
Two firms, 1 and 2, decide on the price and energy efficiency levels simultaneously. 
We denote these choice variables, respectively, as (p1, g1) and (p2, g2). Without loss 
of generality, we assume p1 > p2 and g1 > g2. Now, consumers choose between 
purchasing one unit of the product from firm 1 or from firm 2, or not purchasing any 
good.Consumers prefer buying fromfirm1over firm2 as long as γ g1−p1 ≥ γ g2−p2, 
which results in the following aggregate demand for variety 1: 
p1 − p2
Q1  γ̄ − .
g1 − g2 
Correspondingly, the aggregate demand for firm 2 is composed by the consumers that 
prefer variety 2 over variety 1 (i.e., those for which γ g1 − p1 < γ g2 − p2), as long as 
they prefer purchasing from firm 2 to not purchasing at all (i.e., γ g2 − p2 ≥ 0). This 
results in the following demand for variety 2: 
p1 − p2 p2 p1g2 − p2g1
Q2  −  .
g1 − g2 g2 g2(g1 − g2)
The profit functions for the two firms are therefore: 
  
α p1 − p2 α
π1  p1 Q1 − g12  p1 γ̄ − − g2 2 g1 − g2 2 1   .
α p1g2 − p2g1 α
π2  p2 Q2 − g22  p2 − g2 2 g2(g1 − g2) 2 2 
Each firm finds its corresponding price and energy efficiency level to maximize its 
own profits, taking the choices of the rival firm as given. We present the result of 
this simultaneous game in the following proposition. The proof can be found in the 
‘Appendix.’ 
Proposition 3 In the absence of any policy intervention, the duopolists’ optimal 
choices of the product price and energy effciency level under simultaneous moves 
D  0,091γ̄ 3 D  0,24γ̄ 2 D  0,013γ̄ 3  0,07γ̄ 2 are, respectively, p , g , p and gD .1 α 1 α 2 α 2 α
This duopoly case leads to product differentiation based on the level of product 
energy efficiency. Firm 1 targets consumers with a high appreciation of the firm’s 
effort to reduce the environmental impact of production, while firm 2 targets those 
consumers with a low appreciation for such efforts. Comparing the duopoly outcomes 
with the monopoly outcomes (Proposition 3 vs. Proposition 1), we find that intro-






D D Menergy-efficient design g2 < g1 < g as the amount of rents they can capture  
D D Mfrom consumers decreases and also prices decrease p2 < p1 < p . This is in line  
with the findings from Moraga-Gonzalez and Padron-Fumero (2002), who find that 
a cleaner and a dirtier variant coexist in equilibrium when buyers have a different 
willingness to pay for products, with a reduced environmental impact. 
We now substitute these results to obtain aggregate quantities and firms’ profits: 
0,078γ̄ 3 
αQ1 
D  γ̄ −  0, 54γ̄
0,17γ̄ 2 
α
0,091γ̄ 3 0,07γ̄ 2 − 0,013γ̄ 3 0,24γ̄ 2 p1g2 − p2g1 α α α αQ D      0, 27γ̄2 g2(g1 − g2) 0,07γ̄ 2 0,17γ̄ 2 
α α .
 
0, 091γ̄ 3 α 0, 24γ̄ 2 
2
0, 02γ̄ 4 
πD  0, 54γ̄ −  < πM 1 α 2 α α
 
0, 013γ̄ 3 α γ̄ 2 
2
0, 001γ̄ 4 
πD  0, 27γ̄ − 0, 07  < πM 2 α 2 α α
As expected, competition leads to lower profits for the firms in the market. 
4.2 Sequential choices under laissez-faire 
In the context of the same duopoly, we change the timing of the decisions and we 
consider that firms first choose the energy efficiency level simultaneously, and, in a 
second stage, they choose the price simultaneously. The solution to this alternative 
problem is presented next. The proof can be found in the ‘Appendix.’ 
Proposition 4 In the absence of any policy intervention, the duopolists’ optimal 
choices of the product price and energy effciency level under sequential moves are, 
S 11γ̄ 3 S 26γ̄ 2 S 01γ̄ 3 S 05γ̄ 2 respectively, p1  0, , g1  0, , p2  0, and g2  0, .α α α α
Again, product differentiation occurs, and amore and a less energy-efficient product 
are available in equilibrium. Comparing the level of product energy efficiency in a 
duopoly with sequential moves (denoted by superscript ‘S’) with the results of a 
duopoly with simultaneous moves (denoted by superscript ‘D’) and the monopoly 
results (denoted by superscript ‘M’) leads to the following ranking for firm 1 and 2, 
respectively: 
D M Sg < g < g1 1 
S D Mg2 < g2 < g 
Changing the timing of the duopoly game has two interesting consequences. Firstly, 
the degree of product differentiation with sequential energy efficiency and price deci-













decisions. Secondly, firm 1 now invests more in energy-efficient design than even 
a monopolist would. Interestingly, the price firm 1 sets is below the monopolistic 
price, even when the energy efficiency level that this duopolist chooses is above the 
monopolistic level. 
4.3 Policy scenarios 
We now look at the impact of the three different policy scenarios on incentives for 
energy-efficient design in the duopoly model. 
4.3.1 Raising awareness 
In Propositions 3 and 4, we have shown that γ̄ has a direct effect on both the price and 
the energy efficiency level of the two varieties of the product. Therefore, increases in 
γ̄ (through educational campaigns or marketing) will induce the two firms to increase 
the energy efficiency level of the product and charge a larger price. The ranking of 
prices and energy efficiency levels and the comparison with respect to the monopoly 
case remain the same in the two scenarios for any value of γ̄ . However, as long as γ̄
increases, the differences between the respective levels also increase. 
4.3.2 Product standard 
Wenowconsider a product standard imposed on the energy efficiency level of the firms, 
ḡ. Taking the case of simultaneous choices, the problem is interesting only when the 
required level is larger than the energy efficiency level of firm 2 in the absence of any 
D  0,07γ̄ 2 intervention, that is, ḡ ≥ g2 α . Otherwise, the product standard is non-binding 
and firms simply choose their laissez-faire levels (see Proposition 3). However, when 
the government requires a more demanding standard, firm 2 just complies with it, and 
this has an indirect effect on firm 1, due to the strategic interaction between the two 
firms. The proof of this result is in the ‘Appendix.’ 
Proposition 5 Under the product standard ḡ and a duopoly with simultaneous moves, 
the solution is the following: 
g  0,07γ̄ 2 D  0,091γ̄ 3 D  0,24γ̄ 2 D  0,013γ̄ 3 D(i) If ¯ , then p , g , p , and g 
α 1 α 1 α 2 α 2 
0,07γ̄ 2 .
α
0,07γ̄ 2 0,22γ̄ 2 (ii) If  ḡ < , then pD 
α α 1  1/2 1/2 
γ 2+ ¯ γ 2− γ 2− γ 2− 1/22αḡ+ ¯ γ ¯ 4αḡ ¯ 6αḡ+γ̄ ¯ 4αḡ γ 2+ ¯ γ 2−2αḡ+ ¯ γ ¯ 4αḡ
, gD  ,1/2 1 8α16α γ̄+(γ̄ 2−4αḡ)
 
ḡ γ̄ 2−6αḡ+γ̄ γ̄ 2−4αḡ 1/2 
pD  , and gD  ḡ.2 1/2 24 γ̄+(γ̄ 2−4αḡ)
g ≥ 0,22γ̄ 2 D D D(iii) If ¯ , then p  p  0 and gD  g  ḡ.







Fig. 5 Product standards under 
duopoly 
(i) (ii) (iii) 
We present the result in Fig. 5. The three cases presented in the proposition are 
clearly identified in the figure. In case (i), the two firms over-comply with the standard; 
in case (ii), firm 2 just complies, while firm 1 over-complies. Finally, in case (iii) the 
two firms just comply. Case (ii) is interesting because firm 1 reacts to the fact that firm 2 
has to comply with the standard. There are two effects working in opposite directions. 
On the one hand, firm 1 has an incentive to increase its energy efficiency level as long as 
ḡ 
prices and revenues. On the other hand, increasing the energy efficiency level increases 
the corresponding costs. In our setting, the net effect is negative, which means that 
as long as the product standard increases, firm 1 decreases its corresponding energy 
efficiency level, until the two firms end up just complying with the standard. In fact, 
increases, to maintain the difference between the two firms, which positively affects 
gthis negative effect of ¯
derivative: 
on g1 





which is negative, since γ >¯ γ̄ 2 − 4α
g∂
∂
1 γ̄ 1 − 4 γ̄ 2 − 4α 1/2ḡ 
ḡ
Hence, as long as the product standard increases, the differentiation between the 
two firms diminishes. This has a negative effect on the prices, which end up being zero 
in region (iii), that is, when the two firms just comply with the standard and, therefore, 
supply identical products. Comparing Fig. 5 with Fig. 1, we see that the presence of a 





more demanding standard always induces an increase in the energy efficiency level in 
the monopoly case, in a duopoly the imposition of a standard has a detrimental effect 
on the most energy-efficient firm. As a result, the effect on the prices is completely 
the opposite. While an increase in the standard always induces a price increase under 
monopoly, an increase in the standard induces a decrease in the prices of the two 
varieties under duopoly, until they reach zero prices. Under this situation, profits for 
the firms are negative (zero revenues minus the costs of being green), which suggests 
that a duopoly cannot be sustained in region (iii). 
This interesting result contrastswith the one found inMoraga-González andPadrón-
Fumero (2002), see their Lemma 2 on page 428. They consider the imposition of an 
emission standard, which is met by one of the firms, and further induce a reduction 
in the emission level of the rival firm. Thus, the imposition of the standard causes an 
effect in the same direction on both firms. In our context, however, we find opposing 
effects that diminish differentiation and end up in zero prices. The main difference 
between the two settings is that they consider a model of sequential moves, while we 
consider a model of simultaneous decisions.7 
We now turn to analyze crowding-in and crowding-out effects in this context. 
Remember that we model crowding-in (out) by assuming that γ̄ is an increasing 
(decreasing) function of ḡ. In the monopoly case, we find that the effect of the product 
standard is reinforced (diminished) under crowding-in (out). Here, we obtain a similar 
finding, since gD clearly increases with γ̄ , but the overall effect in the market needs to 1 
be qualified. Again, the interesting region is the one where firm 2 just complies with 
the standard while firm 1 over-complies. Under crowding-out, firm 2 continues to 
comply in this region, but the efficiency level of firm 1 decreases. Crowding-out then 
decreases the differentiation gap between the two firms and, as a consequence, reduces 
prices of the two firms. The threshold level of the standard above which the duopoly 
cannot be sustained is lower when crowding-out is present. Crowding-in has exactly 
the opposite effect than crowding-out, and hence, the differentiation gap between the 
two rivals in the interesting region is wider. However, due to the negative effect of 
the product standard on firm 1, there can be a region where an increase in the product 
standard may end up having a net negative effect on the energy efficiency level of firm 
1. This interesting finding is illustrated in Fig. 6, where we can see that the efficiency 
level of firm 1 lies below the laissez-faire level (0.24γ̄ 2/α) for a subset of values of 
the product standard, ḡ. 
4.3.3 Technology subsidy 
In the duopoly case, a technology subsidy (represented by a decrease in parameter α) 
results in an increase in the energy efficiency level and the product price of the two 
varieties. This can be easily seen by looking at the corresponding expressions presented 
in Propositions 3 and 4. In fact, both the differences in energy efficiency levels and 
prices increase as the amount of the subsidy increases (when α decreases) in the two 
cases of simultaneous moves and sequential choices. Thus, while the product standard 
7 If we instead consider the imposition of a product standard in the model of sequential choices presented 
in Proposition 4, we obtain the same result as Moraga-Gonzalez and Padron-Fumero (2002). 
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crowding-in under duopoly 
v 
< 
generated opposite effects when comparing the two market structures (monopoly and 
duopoly), a technology subsidy induces qualitatively similar effects under the two 
market structures. In particular, the use of a subsidy under severe crowding-out in the 
duopolistic setting can be detrimental for energy efficiency as well. 
5 Conclusions 
The transition toward a sustainable and zero-carbon economic system provides busi-
nesses with many challenges, and a broad set of actions is necessary. One such action 
is energy-efficient product design. Households are increasingly aware of the soci-
etal impacts of their consumption choices. As consumers become more sensitive to 
the environmental impact of specific product characteristics, businesses adapt their 
product and service mixes. Besides business responses to consumer awareness, gov-
ernments also introduce more—and more stringent—environmental regulations. We 
believe that product design, consumer awareness, and regulation have to be stud-
ied simultaneously to account for interactions and feedback effects. For this reason, 
we have developed a model to investigate the effect of education, product standards, 
and technology subsidies on energy-related product characteristics while allowing for 
crowding-in or crowding-out via consumers’ preferences. The different scenarios have 
provided the following set of insights. 
Firstly, explicitly modeling energy-efficient design in a monopoly market provides 
the firm with an additional way to extract rents from consumers. Thus, even without 
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regulation, the firm has an incentive to invest in energy efficiency of the product. 
This can be seen as a good thing if energy-efficient product design is underprovided 
from a social point of view. The firm thus automatically reacts to changing societal 
trends and increasing consumers’ awareness. Introducing competition in the market 
(through a duopoly) leads to product differentiation where, depending on the timing of 
the decisions, one of the firms can be incentivized to invest more in an energy-efficient 
design than in a monopoly setting, even with lower prices. 
Secondly, regulatory instruments influence energy-efficient product design in a 
direct way, but also in an indirect way through consumers’ awareness. The indirect 
effect can reinforce or counteract the direct effect of regulation. The net effect does 
not only depend on the size of crowding-out or crowding-in of consumers’ intrinsic 
motivation to buy green, but also on the type of policy instrument that is used. A 
policy based on a product standard can counteract the negative effects of crowding-
out consumers’ intrinsic motivation. A subsidy does not provide such a backup system, 
and the full effect of crowding-out might be visible. In fact, there can be instances 
in which implementing a technology subsidy can be fully detrimental for energy 
efficiency. 
Thirdly, the presence of a product standard has very different effects depending on 
the market structure. While a more demanding standard always leads to a more energy-
efficient product in the monopoly case, the standard can have a negative effect on the 
environmental impact of the product design selected by the most energy-efficient firm 
in a duopoly. In the most extreme situation, the imposition of strict energy-efficient 
product standards can force one firm out of the market and thus reduce competition. 
Based on these insights, we want to highlight several extensions that are worth 
considering. Firstly, regarding our assumptions, we have considered that a product’s 
energy efficiency level does no directly impact its unit production costs. However, it is 
plausible that a more energy-efficient design makes the production more costly (e.g., 
adding sensors or electronic time clocks) or less costly (e.g., making a product lighter 
implies lower material usage). Also, reducing the amount of embedded carbon in a 
product, e.g., by using solar or wind energy, can shift marginal production costs down-
ward. Thus, it would be interesting to study the interaction effects between product 
design, short-term unit production costs, and long-term operation costs. Secondly, we 
have considered zero reservation utility for the option of not purchasing the product, 
but one may wonder what would happen if the reservation utility were affected by 
the regulation. This may constitute an interesting area of research, because, even in 
the monopoly case, the effects of the reservation utility on both energy efficiency and 
the product price are ambiguous.8 Thirdly, the model would become more realistic 
8 For reservation utility Ū  0, only consumers with marginal willingness to pay γ such that γ g − p ≥ Ū
¯
would purchase the product, and the aggregate demand function in this case would be Q  γ̄ − Ug +p . If  
we consider the monopolist’s optimization problem (as in (3)) for this demand function, we obtain that the 
optimal energy efficiency level and product price are implicitly given by the expressions 4αg3−γ̄ 2g2+Ū2 
γ̄ g−Ū0 and  p  . There is an unambiguous negative effect of the reservation utility on both the energy 2 
efficiency level and the product price as long as the optimal energy efficiency level is larger than γ̄ 2/6α. 
However, for the alternative case, a change in the reservation utility has a positive effect on the energy 
efficiency level and an ambiguous effect on the product price. Additional ambiguities can be found in the 
more complex duopolistic situations. 
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by allowing a heterogeneous cost structure. Differences in production costs may lead 
to differences in production quantities or product prices with the most efficient firm 
producing the most (or charging the lowest price) and the least efficient firm producing 
the least (or charging the highest price) (see, for example, Wang and Zhao 2009). In 
addition, one may analyze a setting where there is one installed firm and a potential 
incumbent. This timing is different from the ones we have analyzed in the paper, since 
the installed firm would choose both the energy efficiency level and the product price 
in the first place. This alternative modeling may raise interesting issues regarding the 
possibility to accommodate or deter entry, which are beyond the scope of the present 
study. 
Further, it would be interesting to investigate the full welfare effects of the different 
policy scenarios including implementation costs such as costs of educational reforms, 
advertising campaigns, administrative costs, and monitoring activities as well as the 
net effect on environmental quality. Based on the calculation of the welfare effects, the 
regulator would then be able to choose the most desirable policy option, while taking 
the reaction of firms and households into account. 
Finally, note that we only investigate one option to make our economic and energy 
system more sustainable, but several other options are available. An interesting evo-
lution is the move toward product–service system or even full servitization within the 
transition to a circular economy. Policymakers are increasingly aware of the impor-
tance to coordinate climate and circular economy policy actions to achieve a more 
sustainable economic system. 
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∂π1 2p1 p2 γ̄ − +  0,
∂p1 g1 − g2 g1 − g2 
∂π1 p1(p1 − p2) 2 − αg1  0,∂g1 (g1 − g2)
∂π2 p1g2 − 2p2g1  0,
∂p2 g2(g1 − g2)
∂π2 p1g2(g1 − g2)− (p1g2 − p2g1)(g1 − 2g2) p2 2 2 − αg2  0.∂g2 g2(g1 − g2)
γ (g1−g2)+p2From the first and third conditions, we, respectively, obtain p1  ¯ and2 
γ (g1−g2) γ (g1−g2)p2  p1g2 , from which we easily get p1  2g1 ¯ and p2  g2 ¯ .On the 2g1 4g1−g2 4g1−g2 
p1g2
2+p2g2 2p2g1g21−one hand, the fourth first-order condition can be simplified as p2 2 2 −g2(g1−g2)
γ (g1−g2) γ (g1−g2)αg2  0, and we can substitute expressions p1  2g1 ¯ and p2  g2 ¯ in4g1−g2 4g1−g2 
there, to obtain: 
γ̄ 2g1
2  αg2(4g1 − g2)2 .
γ (g1−g2) γ (g1−g2)On the other hand, we can substitute p1  2g1 ¯ and p2  g2 ¯ in the 4g1−g2 4g1−g2 
second first-order condition, to obtain: 
2γ̄ 2(2g1 − g2)  α(4g1 − g2)2 .
1Combining these two resulting conditions, we have 
g2  2(2g1 − g2), or put differ-g2 
2 2 2 2 2ently, g1 +2g2 −4g1g2  0. This expression is equivalent to g1 +4g2 −4g1g2  2g2,   
2that is, (g1 − 2g2)2  2g2, which yields g1  2 +  
√
2 g2  3, 41g2. Substitut-
γ 2 2 2ing this condition into ¯ g1  αg2(4g1 − g2) , we obtain two candidate solutions: 
D  0,07γ̄ 2 D  0,24γ̄ 2 D Dg < gM and g1 α < gM ; or  g  g2  0.We concentrate on the2 α 1 
first possibility. (The second leads to no green effort and zero profits and, hence, it is 
γ (g1−g2) γ (g1−g2)not interesting.) We use conditions p1  2g1 ¯ and p2  g2 ¯ to obtain 4g1−g2 4g1−g2 
the respective equilibrium prices in the duopoly case: 
    
0,24γ̄ 2 0,24γ̄ 2 − 0,07γ̄ 2 2 γ̄
α α α 0, 091γ̄ 3 
pD     < pM ,1 0,24γ̄ 2 − 0,07γ̄ 2 α4 
α α
    
0,07γ̄ 2 0,24γ̄ 2 − 0,07γ̄ 2 γ̄
α α α 0, 013γ̄ 3 





Proof of Proposition 4 We start by solving the second stage of the problem (which 
consists of taking the first-order derivative of each profit function with respect to the 
respective price): 
∂π1 2p1 p2 γ̄ − +  0,
∂p1 g1 − g2 g1 − g2 
∂π2 p1g2 − 2p2g1  0,
∂p2 g2(g1 − g2)
from which we obtain prices as functions of the two energy efficiency levels, p1 
2g1γ (¯ g1−g2)  g2γ (¯ g1−g2)and p2 , as in the previous case.We substitute these two 4g1−g2 4g1−g2 
expressions in the respective profit functions to obtain: 
1
2(g1 − g2) 24γ̄ 2g απ1  2 − g1,(4g1 − g2) 2 
γ̄ 2g1g2(g1 − g2) α
π2  − g22 ,
(4g1 − g2)2 2 
and we now take the partial derivative of profits with respect to the respective energy 
efficiency levels, as follows: 
∂π1 4γ̄ 2   2 2 − 8 3 2 3g1 − 2g1g2 (4g1 − g2) g1 − g1 g2 (4g1 − g2) − αg1  0,∂g1 (4g1 − g2)4 
∂π2 γ̄
2g1    (g1 − 2g2)(4g1 − g2)2 + 2g2(g1 − g2)(4g1 − g2) − αg2  0.
∂g2 (4g1 − g2)4 
From these two conditions, we, respectively, get: 
   3α(4g1 − g2)4 (3g1 − 2g2)(4g1 − g2)− 8 g12 − g1g2  γ̄ 2 
.
g1 α(4g1 − g2)3 {(g1 − 2g2)(4g1 − g2) + 2g2(g1 − g2)} 
g2 γ̄ 2 
Now, we combine these two expressions to have: 
   
4 (3g1 − 2g2) (4g1 − g2) − 8 g12 − g1g2 
g1 {(g1 − 2g2) (4g1 − g2) + 2g2 (g1 − g2)} ,
g2 
and we conjecture g1   g2 for the solution. Note that following this procedure, 
one possible solution is always g1  g2  0 (which is not interesting). We concen-
trate in the interior solution, which results in:4{(3 − 2)(4 − 1)− 8 ( − 1)}   
{( − 2)(4 − 1) + 2 − 2}, from which we obtain;4 3 − 23 2 + 12 − 8  0, and 
a unique real solution (there are two additional imaginary solutions),   5, 25. This 
therefore means that g1  5, 25g2.We now go back to the first above expression and 






S  0, 05γ̄
2
1 
S  0, 26γ̄
2 
Mg < gM and g > g .
α α
Following a similar procedure as before, we now substitute equilibrium energy effi-
ciency levels in the corresponding expressions for the prices and the aggregate 
1 
S  0,11γ̄ 3 M 2 S  0,01γ̄
3 Mdemands, and we obtain:p < p , p < p , Q1 
S  0, 53γ̄ and
α α
 0,0245γ̄ 4 Q2 S  0, 26γ̄ ,which results in respective equilibrium profits:π S < πM 1 α
2  0,0013γ̄
4 
and π S < πM .
α
Proof of Proposition 5 Here, we prove case (ii), because case (i) has been proven in 
Proposition 3 (in this case, the standard is very weak and does not affect the laissez-
faire solution), and case (iii) follows directly from the explanation of case (ii) in the 
g ≥ 0,07γ̄ 2 upper part of the interval. When ¯ , firm 2 just complies with the standard. 
α
The first-order conditions of this problem coincide with the first three conditions of 
Proposition 3 when g2  ḡ, presented in the corresponding proof above, that is: 
∂π1 2p1 p2 γ̄ − +  0,
∂p1 g1 − ḡ g1 − ḡ 
∂π1 p1(p1 − p2) 2 − αg1  0,∂g1 (g1 − ḡ)
∂π2 p1ḡ − 2p2g1  0.
∂p2 g2(g1 − ḡ)
From the first and third conditions, we can get the respective prices as a function 
γ (g1−ḡ)of g1 and ḡ, exactly as in the proof of Proposition 3, that is, p1  2g1 ¯ and4g1−ḡ 
gγ (¯ g1−ḡ)p2  ¯ . Now, we substitute these two expressions in the second first-order 4g1−ḡ
condition, and we obtain: 
2γ̄ 2(2g1 − ḡ)  α(4g1 − ḡ)2 .
 
2αḡ+γ̄ 2±γ̄ γ̄ 2−4αḡ 1/2 
From this condition,we get two candidates for the solution: g1  8α .  
2αḡ+γ̄ 2+γ̄ γ̄ 2−4αḡ 1/2 
Since g1 must be strictly larger than ḡ, the solution must be g1  8α , 
0,22γ̄ 2 for ḡ < . This limiting value of ḡ comes from substituting a value of g1 suf-α
ficiently close (but larger) than ḡ into the implicit expression 2γ̄ 2(2g1 − ḡ)  α
γ 2 ¯ 2 g  2γ̄ 2  0,22γ̄ 2 (4g1 − ḡ)2 to obtain 2 ¯ , from which we get ¯ . Finally, g  α(3ḡ) 9α α
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